Tuesday, 9 October 2012
Pictures NATO
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21 May 2012
Chicago NATO Summit announces withdrawal of troopss from Afghanistan
Pictures: ["with our own funny comments"]
Camp David, Washington, May 2012. ["Ok cowboys, its too hot in Afghaistan]

Kandahar 2012. ["Damn its hot in Afghanistan"]

Chicago 2012. ["Ok, Ok, tough guy. Our ten greens for your one white gold.]

21 May 2012
Chicago NATO Summit announces withdrawal of troopss from Afghanistan
Pictures: ["with our own funny comments"]
Camp David, Washington, May 2012. ["Ok cowboys, its too hot in Afghaistan]

Kandahar 2012. ["Damn its hot in Afghanistan"]

Chicago 2012. ["Ok, Ok, tough guy. Our ten greens for your one white gold.]

Afghanistan Ending
NATO AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL
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A new report on Afghanistan warns that the departure of Nato forces in 2014 could be followed by the government's collapse and even civil war.
8 October 2012 Last updated at 12:17
A new report on Afghanistan warns that the departure of Nato forces in 2014 could be followed by the government's collapse and even civil war, unless steps are taken now.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) says the Afghan police and army are unprepared for security responsibility.#
It added that polls in two years' time would be "plagued" by fraud unless the state acted to ensure a clean vote.
The Afghan government labelled the predictions "nonsense and garbage".
"Our nation was not born in 2002. We have a history of 5,000 years. We have fought against superpowers in the past. Our national police and army are ready to defend the country's soul and sovereignty," a statement said.
The government spokesman added that if the international community fulfilled its pledges of future support, Nato's withdrawal in 2014 would not make any difference.
'Time running out'
But the report from the Brussels-based group is stark in its prediction that the Western-backed government in Afghanistan could be on course for what it calls a devastating political crisis after 2014.
It states that "steps to ensure a stable transition must begin now to prevent a precipitous slide toward state collapse. Time is running out."
That same year elections are due in Afghanistan and the report predicts that the forthcoming polls will be as fraudulent as the last ones.
"It is a near certainty that under current conditions the 2014 elections will be plagued by massive fraud. Vote-rigging in the south and east, where security continues to deteriorate, is all but guaranteed," the report warns.
The report also says that Afghanistan 's President Hamid Karzai - who is not allowed to run again - may be trying to "stack the deck" for a favoured candidate.
The government statement asserted that forthcoming polls would be "free and fair and without any foreign interference."
But the ICG report concludes that failure to act on these issues could indirectly lead to a political impasse that would provide a pretext for the declaration of a state of emergency, which could in turn lead to the collapse of the state.
It made several recommendations to parliament, the election commission and the international community to help assure a peaceful political transition.
Nato combat troops are set to withdraw by the end of 2014, but a central plank of the strategy is that foreign soldiers will serve alongside and train Afghans for many years to come.
Analysis:
Andrew North, BBC News, Kabul
The reaction to this somewhat apocalyptic ICG report shows how wide the gulf has become between the Afghan government and its Western backers - as the 2014 Nato withdrawal approaches.
There is a battle for perceptions going on. President Karzai recently lashed out at the foreign media over what he called its "psychological war" of gloomy predictions. His advisers see this report as part of a deliberate campaign.
Western leaders are trying to manage perceptions back home, but this helps feed fears in Kabul . Britain 's prime minister said the UK would not leave behind a "perfect country" with "perfect government".
Afghans are somewhere in the middle - increasingly mistrustful of President Karzai's administration - yet also irritated by the patronising tone they detect in such comments.
But history teaches them to be fearful. As one Afghan teacher said to me: "We don't want the foreigners to go yet. We still need their help."
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19868043
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[In Chicago , city of gangsters, NATO announces retreat from Afhganistan in 2014.]
22 May 2012 Last updated at 00:25
Is Nato's Afghan timetable a milestone or millstone?
Mark Mardell, North America editor
The Chicago Nato summit marked a "milestone". That was the word chosen to spin the summit.
It is a more than usually evocative and revealing word. "Milestone" makes me think not of the end of a journey, but of the long slog still ahead. Nearly there, but not quite. #
It looks like a tombstone and sounds like a millstone.
The Nato leaders would have given their game away a little more had they chosen an image that implied more of an unstoppable momentum. A runaway truck or a falling boulder. Because that is what this summit was really about.
There will be a handover of combat operations to Afghan control next year. While the military brass interpret this simply as not being in the lead in fighting, the politicians go a little further, suggesting Nato will only play a "support" role.
And then, on 31 December 2014, all Nato combat operations will stop. No ifs and no buts. No conditions on the ground, no generals, and no wider political changes will stop that.
That much had already been decided, but this summit was a public display of inevitability. Future leaders are tied to the timetable.
It might be quite awkward for a President-elect Mitt Romney to turn around after November's US presidential election and tell his Nato allies that they are staying in Afghanistan a bit longer after all. He would not have any allies with him - or many voters.
'Ultimate nightmare'
The idea of an orderly progress towards a reasonable end state was paramount. But occasional fractures here gave a glimpse of the messy reality that lies beyond.
First, the French. There would be no rush for the exit, we were told. The policy of "in together, out together" would stand.
No matter that the new French president had made it quite clear all his troops would come home by the end of this year.
He did not budge or fudge, but Nato's leaders rather ignored him and just hoped no-one else would follow his lead and start elbowing others out of the way in their desire to get home.
Then there was Pakistan . By the end of the meeting everyone thought there was an end in sight to the row about supply lines. But it underlined a couple of important points.
It is hard to see how Pakistan will have stopped being a safe-haven for the Taliban and a source of instability to Afghanistan .
The focus on the long and difficult supply lines was also a reminder of how vulnerable Nato will be as it trundles thousands of tons of equipment home, and men and materiel queue up to get out.
Then there was us. The British have been perfectly behaved allies in American eyes, but one British official somewhat gave the game away.
He said the absolute and obvious truth when he told the political press pack: "It is unrealistic to assume that Afghanistan is going to be completely secure and there is no possibility of a terrorist threat re-emerging in some part of it."
But that is the ultimate nightmare: that the allies will quick-march home, past the milestones, in time to meet the date ringed in the calendar, only to find the very threat they fought for 13 years to eliminate emerges once more.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18155292
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22 May 2012 Last updated at 07:40
Nato endorses Afghanistan withdrawal timetable
“The Chicago Nato summit marked a 'milestone'. That was the word chosen to spin the summit” - Mark Mardell, North America editor
Nato leaders meeting in Chicago have endorsed plans to hand over combat command to Afghan forces by mid-2013.
They confirmed Nato's combat troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2014, with only training units remaining.
But US President Barack Obama pledged that: "As Afghans stand up, they will not stand alone."#
Nato also said it was optimistic Pakistan would reopen supply routes that were closed after a US air strike in 2011 killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.
The two-day meeting brought together leaders from more than 50 nations, including 28 Nato countries, as well as Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari.
'Right track'
Nato's summit statement stressed that the transition to Afghan control was "irreversible" and that no combat mission would remain after the end of 2014, when 130,000 Nato-led troops are scheduled to have left.
However, Mr Obama issued a pledge to stand by the Afghan people.
He said Nato would continue to "advise and assist Afghan forces as they grow stronger".
But he added: "The Afghan forces will never be prepared if they don't start taking responsibility."
Mr Obama said there would "never be an optimum point where we can say this is all done - it's a process and sometimes a messy process".
But he said: "The coalition is committed to the plan to bringing the war in Afghanistan to a responsible end."
Although the timetable had risks, Mr Obama said he believed it was "sound and responsible".
Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen touched on the question of the funding of Afghan security forces post-2014, denying that the summit was intended to be a pledging conference.
He said he was pleased a number of countries had made new pledges and denied there was any shortfall in funds.
Mr Rasmussen said: "We are on the right track to reaching the goal of around $4bn a year for financing of Afghan security forces - it's a positive story."
However, the question of the Pakistani supply route has cast a shadow over the summit.
Mr Rasmussen denied that Mr Zardari had been invited to the summit to seal a deal on reopening the supply routes, saying: "We did not expect an agreement on Pakistan transit routes to be reached at this summit."
Mr Obama agreed, saying: "We didn't anticipate the supply issue would be resolved but we are making diligent progress."
Mr Rasmussen said the closure had so far not had a major impact on Nato operations but would constitute a logistical challenge when the draw-down of troops began.
He added: "We would like to see the reopening of the routes as soon as possible... the ones through Pakistan are of great importance and I would expect a reopening of the transit routes in the very near future."
Mr Zardari was quoted as saying that his government was in favour of reaching a deal with Nato on the supply routes.
Mr Obama, who said he had only had a brief discussion with Mr Zardari, admitted there had been tension with Pakistan "over the past several months".
He said he did not want to paper over those cracks, but insisted the problems were being worked through.
The supply route was closed in November after the US air strike.
Frictions with Pakistan appeared to continue at the summit - Mr Zardari sat in a meeting as Mr Obama thanked Afghanistan 's other neighbours for allowing war supply shipments to be expanded since the closure of the Pakistani routes.
The US president also gave a warning to Islamabad . "Ultimately it is in our interest to see a successful, stable Pakistan and it is in Pakistan's interests to work with us and the world community to ensure that they themselves are not consumed by extremism that is in their midst," he told reporters at the closing news conference.
'New mindset'
Mr Rasmussen said the Chicago summit had been "highly successful" in "renewing the unbreakable bond between North America and Europe ".
He said: "Nato is fit to face the future, no matter what the future brings."
Mr Cameron said that Nato had agreed it needed a "new mindset".
He said: "Nato should look outwards, reassert its relevance and be ready to tackle threats that may lay outside its territories" but which continue to be a risk to its members.
Mr Cameron also addressed the Taliban, saying: "The message to the insurgency is equally clear: You can't win on the battlefield; stop fighting and start talking."
More than 10 years after the US toppled the Taliban regime, violence is continuing unabated in Afghanistan .
According to UN figures, the number of deaths reached a record 3,031 in 2011 - the great majority caused by militants.
Analysis:
Caroline Wyatt - Defence correspondent, BBC News, Chicago
Nato leaders had a difficult balancing act to perform.
On the one hand, they wanted to make clear to their war-weary public that their combat forces' part in the war in Afghanistan will soon be over.
On the other, they sought to reassure and convince the Afghans that they will not be abandoned come 2014.
It is not clear whether either audience has been convinced. For Nato the war may indeed soon be over, but not for the Afghans themselves. Even Nato forces still have at least another year of fighting - and perhaps dying - before Afghan forces are in the lead.
For the Afghans, the pledge of most of the $4bn a year needed to train security forces after the Nato withdrawal may be some consolation, but many remain concerned about what will happen when Nato forces leave.
This summit may have been claimed by the alliance as a milestone, but for the Afghans the road ahead looks far from smooth, while nobody at Chicago even tried to talk of "victory".
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18154227
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21 May 2012 Last updated at 03:08
Mission, sort of, accomplished
Mark Mardell, North America editor
You won't hear anyone say "mission accomplished". That was the banner that hung behind George W Bush on an aircraft carrier as he declared the Iraq war won. Just before it spiralled into chaos.
But the message that the leaders want to go out from the Nato summit is that war is, nearly, over. For the West at any rate. #
It hasn't been won but the mission is, sort of, accomplished.
That doesn't mean we are leaving Afghanistan in the lurch. Far from it. It is a difficult, nuanced, some would say contradictory, message.
One of the stories about war that has always haunted me is that of World War I soldiers fighting and dying as the clock ticked down to the war's end. The armistice agreement, signed six hours earlier, was the designated time when their political masters had decided the slaughter would stop.
I have been asking some of those involved whether the end in Afghanistan amounts to a prolonged version of much the same thing.
For the next two years British and American soldiers will be risking their lives for a war that we know will end in 2014, no matter what.
Has Nato masterfully spun an acceptance of defeat and subsequent retreat into something that looks a bit like victory?
Surprisingly frank
The 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division may bear the brunt of the final fighting. They will be among the last troops going over to Afghanistan , some time in the autumn.
They have been training at Fort Bliss in Texas , practising operations in mocked-up Afghan villages, charging from helicopters but encountering people posing as innocent locals.
Some of them were surprisingly frank when they spoke to my colleagues about fighting at the fag end of a war and handing over control to others.
Here's a selection of quotes:
"It has pros and cons, it kind of sucks that it's the end, we may get stuck doing details and closing up, packing up to go home - but on the other side, we get closure. It's not like we're going to leave things half done.
"It's an interesting idea [transferring power to Afghans]. On paper I think it's a good idea to get everyone involved - everyone feels like they have a piece of solving the problem - but in reality, I think it'll probably be a mess."
"I do think they want to be 'there' and I think the effort is going to be there - my only concern is, is the government of Afghanistan gonna be there? With pay, with material, with equipment and that kind of thing."
"Instead of fighting the Taliban, now it's about bringing home as many people as we can.
"We're not fighting a conventional army like World War II or Korea , now we're fighting an ideal, so… you can't really destroy the ideas that we're fighting against so even once we leave it's going to be a conflict that continues."
So is this just about winding down a war that cannot be won?
President Obama's national security adviser, Ben Rhodes, told me: "You have to keep in mind what the core objective was when we went to war in the first place. It was to defeat al-Qaeda and deny them a safe haven. We've actually made tremendous progress towards that goal in the last two or three years.
"What we need to do now is make sure Afghanistan cannot re-emerge as a safe haven for al-Qaeda.
"It is not going to be a perfect place, it's not going to be a Western-style democracy. When we leave, there are still going to be elements of violence."
But isn't it just odd to go on fighting a war that you are going to end?
Ben Rhodes says the experience of Iraq has been important.
"Without a timeline you can't transition to foreign security forces being in the lead. A timeline is necessary to discipline this process and make clear the schedule under which they are going to take responsibility for their own security and then allow us to plan the draw down of our own forces."
It seems obvious to me that Obama has been pretty hard-headed, deciding to end a war when it was clear to him that it couldn't be "won" in a conventional sense.
This view is supported by an important article by David Sanger in the New York Times.
Sanger's record is impressive. He gets the inside story more often than any other Washington journalist. He says that after a year in power, Obama decided that remaking Afghanistan was a fantasy and that his generals shouldn't be allowed to push him to give them more time, so the decision to pull out was taken without them.
The man who stood against Obama in 2004, John McCain, thinks it was a basic mistake to set a deadline for the end of the war.
He told me: "I hate to be bound by dates, because it is not dates but conditions on the ground that dictate. I think that [the 2013 handover] would have been much more likely if the president hadn't drawn down earlier despite the objections of his military commanders."
He is heartened by the strategic agreement with Afghanistan , which will last for 10 years, but feels the president's stress has been all wrong.
"All he is doing is talk about withdrawal, getting out. All of us, Americans and Europeans, are war weary.
"That is why it requires a president of the United States to explain to people why we cannot allow Afghanistan to return to what it was on 11 September 2001. It requires presidential leadership. This president is MIA [Missing In Action]."
The many anti-war protesters who gathered on the streets of Chicago believe the real problem is the exact opposite.
Among them is Occupy Washington 's Kevin Zeese. He says soldiers are going on fighting their way towards a deadline for one reason.
"That's what happens when you lose a war. It is like Iraq . This is how you get out when you lose."
He thinks that French President Francois Hollande has got it right, and Obama has it wrong.
"He is signing an agreement that will keep us there until 2024, he has already signed that agreement. It will need troops there for a long time.
"We are the bull in the china shop, until you get the bull out of the china shop you can't fix the china shop. We need to leave as quickly as possible, a rapid exit."
The dangers of setting a deadline for ending a war, to bring the troops home by a specific date on the calendar are legion.
It hasn't quite dawned on many people what it will feel like to be in harm's way (even if not in "a lead combat role") just months from the end of the effort.
But President Obama and the other leaders have decided this brutal clarity is necessary so people at home understand the war really is almost over.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18140922
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20 May 2012 Last updated at 03:54
Nato: What is it for?
Mark Mardell, North America editor
The main purpose of the latest Nato summit is to emphasise that the organisation's longest, biggest ever operation is nearly at an end.
They will announce that next year will be a "milestone" when the lead combat role is handed over to Afghan forces. #
The purpose is to stress that for the West, the fighting will soon be over. But we aren't leaving. It is a delicate, difficult balance. But that is for tomorrow.
Today the alliance is talking about more existential questions - why are we here? What are we for?
Freed from MAD
It is a question Nato has been forced to ask before. After all, it was set up as a counterweight to the Soviet Union 's military might.
When that empire crumbled, it cast around for a new role and found it in expansion and absorption of many of the old Warsaw Pact.
But the end of the old Cold War stand off meant more. It unleashed Nato from the caution imposed by Mutually Assured Destruction and meant it could go to war.
It did so in a limited way as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated. It did so in Afghanistan , invoking for the first time Clause Five, which states as its main purpose: if one member is attacked, it should be treated as an attack on all.
But in two years time Afghanistan will be over, and Nato will be looking for a role.
It will be doing so as the European economic crisis means governments are keen to cut their armed forces.
It does so as the United States turns its attention to Asia . The South Pacific is a more likely area of conflict than the North Atlantic .
Nurturing Nato
Nato could draw its horns in and stick to its stated responsibility to safeguard its members' freedom. While Russia is no longer an enemy, it is not exactly a trusted friend.
After all, a coming Nato operation, Steadfast Jazz, imagines the invasion of the Baltics by powers unknown.
But this will not be enough.
Some, although few within Nato itself, want that repeated in Syria . To many on the left this is just another threadbare disguise for American imperial power.
Call it what you will, it is certainly a role that would keep Nato busy. But it is hardly likely to become an explicit purpose.
However, Nato will be nurtured. For those who believe that American power is a good in the world it is an essential tool. They won't allow it to rust.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18135456
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NATO STATEMENT: #
21 May. 2012
Issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Preamble
1.We, the nations contributing to ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, met today in Chicago to renew our firm commitment to a sovereign, secure and democratic Afghanistan . In line with the strategy which we agreed at the Lisbon Summit, ISAF’s mission will be concluded by the end of 2014. But thereafter Afghanistan will not stand alone: we reaffirm that our close partnership will continue beyond the end of the transition period.
2.In the ten years of our partnership the lives of Afghan men, women and children, have improved significantly in terms of security, education, health care, economic opportunity and the assurance of rights and freedoms. There is more to be done, but we are resolved to work together to preserve the substantial progress we have made during the past decade. The nations contributing to ISAF will therefore continue to support Afghanistan on its path towards self-reliance in security, improved governance, and economic and social development. This will prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan , the region, and the world. A secure and stable Afghanistan will make an important contribution to its region, in which security, stability and development are interlinked.
3.ISAF nations and Afghanistan join in honouring all those – civilian or military, Afghan or foreign – who have lost their lives or been injured in the fight for our common security and a prosperous, peaceful and stable Afghanistan . We pay particular tribute to the courage of the armed forces of Afghanistan and ISAF countries who live, train and fight next to each other every day. We are determined that all our sacrifices will be justified by our strong long-term partnership, which will contribute to a better future for the people of Afghanistan .
General principles
4.Our efforts are part of the broader engagement of the International Community as outlined by the Kabul Conference in July 2010, the Istanbul Process on regional security and cooperation which was launched in November 2011 and the Bonn Conference in December 2011.
5.We recall the firm mutual commitments made at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011, which form the basis of our long-term partnership. In this context, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan confirms its resolve to deliver on its commitment to a democratic society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress in the fight against corruption, where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the equality of men and women and the active participation of both in Afghan society, are respected. The forthcoming elections must be conducted with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution. Their transparency, inclusivity and credibility will also be of paramount importance. In this context, continued progress towards these goals will encourage ISAF nations to further provide their support up to and beyond 2014.
6.We emphasise the importance of full participation of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements protecting their rights. We remain committed to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security. We recognise also the need for the protection of children from the damaging effects of armed conflict as required in relevant UNSCRs.
Fulfilling the Lisbon Roadmap and building the Enduring Partnership
7.In Lisbon , in November 2010, we decided on the phased transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), in order to enable Afghans to take full responsibility for their own security. NATO/ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remain committed to this transition strategy which began in July 2011. Irreversible transition is on track and will be completed by the end of 2014. We also recognise in this context the importance of a comprehensive approach and continued improvements in governance and development.
8.The third wave of provinces to enter the transition process was announced by President Karzai on 13 May 2012. This means that 75% of Afghanistan ’s population will soon be living in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security. By mid-2013, all parts of Afghanistan will have begun transition and the Afghan forces will be in the lead for security nation-wide. This will mark an important milestone in the Lisbon roadmap. ISAF is gradually and responsibly drawing down its forces to complete its mission by 31 December 2014.
9.The success of transition has been enabled by the substantial improvement of the ANSF since Lisbon in terms of capability and professionalism. Afghan soldiers are increasingly taking the lead in operations on Afghan soil. Afghan forces, both army and police, have proven able to maintain security in those areas which have already entered into transition.
10.The completion of transition, however, will not mean the end of the International Community’s commitment to Afghanistan ’s stability and development. Afghanistan and NATO reaffirm their commitment to further develop the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership signed at Lisbon in 2010 in all its dimensions, up to 2014 and beyond, including through joint programmes to build capacity such as the Building Integrity Initiative. In this context, NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will now deepen their consultations towards shaping the Enduring Partnership.
11.Meanwhile, we welcome the fact that a number of ISAF countries have concluded, or are in the process of concluding, bilateral partnership agreements with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. These bilateral partnership frameworks will form the basis of cooperation and friendship between an independent, sovereign and democratic Afghanistan and those countries on the basis of equality and mutual interest.
Beyond 2014
12.In order to safeguard and build on the substantial progress and shared achievement, ISAF nations reaffirm their enduring commitment to Afghan security beyond 2014; the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to welcome that support.
13.ISAF, including the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan , has played a key role in taking the ANSF to the levels they have now reached. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan reaffirms that NATO has a crucial part to play, with partners and alongside other actors, in training, advising and assisting the ANSF and invites NATO to continue its support. As transition of security responsibility is completed at the end of 2014, NATO will have made the shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission, which will be of a different nature to the current ISAF mission.
14.We agree to work towards establishing such a new NATO-led mission. We will ensure that the new mission has a sound legal basis, such as a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
Sustaining the ANSF
15.With the support of ISAF nations, Afghanistan is committed to developing an ANSF which is governed by the Constitution and is capable of providing security to all Afghans. It will operate under effective civilian leadership, in accordance with the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
16.At the International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn on 5 December 2011, the wider International Community decided to support the training, equipping, financing and capability development of the ANSF beyond the end of the transition period. NATO Allies and ISAF partners reaffirm their strong commitment to this process and will play their part in the financial sustainment of the ANSF. We also call on the International Community to commit to this long-term sustainment. The pace and the size of a gradual managed force reduction from the ANSF surge peak to a sustainable level will be conditions-based and decided by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in consultation with the International Community. The preliminary model for a future total ANSF size, defined by the International Community and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, envisages a force of 228,500 with an estimated annual budget of US$4.1billion, and will be
reviewed regularly against the developing security environment.
17.Sustaining a sufficient and capable ANSF is the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan supported by the International Community. As part of the wider International Community, and building upon existing mechanisms, we will play our part in developing appropriate, coherent and effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF. Such mechanisms will be flexible, transparent, accountable, cost-effective and will include measures against corruption. They will also distinguish between funding for the army and the police as well as for further capacity development within the relevant Afghan ministries and security institutions.
18.As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share will increase progressively from at least US$500m in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. In the light of this, during the Transformation Decade, we expect international donors will reduce their financial contributions commensurate with the assumption by the Afghan government of increasing financial responsibility.
19.As the Afghan National Police further develop and professionalise, they will evolve towards a sustainable, credible, and accountable civilian law enforcement force that will shoulder the main responsibility for domestic security. This force should be capable of providing policing services to the Afghan population as part of the broader Afghan rule of law system. This will require an adequate plan to be developed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, supported as appropriate by the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) or its successor. Both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police will play a crucial role in ensuring security and stability, and in supporting legitimate governance and sustainable economic growth across the country.
Towards a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan
20.A political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration is key to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan . In this context, we reiterate the importance of the principles decided at the Bonn Conference. These are that the process leading to reconciliation must be truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, and must be inclusive and representative of the legitimate interests of all Afghan people, regardless of gender or status. Reconciliation must also contain the reaffirmation of a sovereign, stable and united Afghanistan , the renunciation of violence, the breaking of ties to international terrorism, and compliance with the Afghan Constitution, including its human rights provisions, especially on the rights of women.
21.A peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan will positively contribute to economic and social development in the wider region, and deliver progress in the fight against narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and crime. In this context, regional cooperation and support for stability in Afghanistan is key. There are two important events on the way to securing the future commitment of key regional and international partners. The upcoming Kabul Ministerial Conference on the Istanbul Process will launch an initial set of regional confidence-building measures while at the Tokyo Conference the International Community and Afghan leadership will discuss a framework for future development assistance.
22.Our task is not yet complete. But in the light of our substantial achievements, and building on our firm and shared commitment, we are confident that our strong partnership will lead Afghanistan towards a better future.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2FA93455-CDF9576F/natolive/official_texts_87595.htm?
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[Why Nato Lost the War in Afghanistan ]
Green on blue
The collapse of trust between troops in Afghanistan
7 October 2012 Last updated at 00:41
By Quentin Sommerville - BBC News, Kabul
As the number of Nato troops killed by their Afghan counterparts continues to rise - attacks known as "green on blue" - many are left wondering if the breakdown of this relationship will result in an early exit for international forces in Afghanistan. #
In a circle of trees at the heart of the international mission's headquarters in Kabul , there are 50 flags. One for each of the coalition countries that make up the force that is fighting the Taliban.
Under the branches, in the early morning shade, a few hundred soldiers stand still, listening, as the names of that week's dead are read aloud.
The first was that of a Jordanian soldier, then a British sergeant and two British captains. Next an American gunner's mate, and two more sergeants.
An Afghan officer stepped forward. He read just a number: 31. The service is short, it barely lasts five minutes. There is not enough time to read the names of all the Afghan dead.
Some names give more pause for thought than others. Sgt Gareth Thursby and Pte Thomas Wroe were killed earlier in the month in Nahr-e Saraj in Helmand .
They were not killed by the Taliban, but by an Afghan policeman they were serving alongside.
As the number of these "green on blue" or insider attacks has risen, British soldiers have taken extra precautions. One is to be armed at all times, even when men are sleeping. These men are called "guardian angels".
In the Nahr-e Saraj killings the Afghan policeman looked like he was in pain. The British soldiers reacted with compassion. The guardian angel put down his weapon as he tried to help - and that is when the killer, the policeman, struck.
"Murder" is a word you rarely hear in war. Killing is part of the business, and is viewed by most as lawful according to international protocols.
But recently, the commander of international forces here, General John Allen, sat opposite his Afghan counterparts and said that while his troops were prepared to die for Afghanistan , they were not prepared to be murdered.
A quarter of all British soldiers who have been killed here this year were killed by Afghan police or army colleagues.
Some were Taliban infiltrators. Others, men with a grievance, who shot those they served with in the back, or in the face, or somewhere their body armour and helmets offered no protection.
Trust is collapsing between these two forces, who should be united in their fight against the Taliban.
The international mission suspended many routine joint patrols with Afghans as it sought to stop the attacks. A huge step, since Nato's strategy relies on training Afghans to fight the Taliban when most international forces leave at the end of 2014.
Senior generals and the Ministry of Defence claimed that this was no big deal, but few believe them.
One senior diplomat told me the switch would go down in the history books.
It could be a "game changer", he said. Afghan generals were furious - they felt abandoned and claimed a propaganda victory had been handed to the insurgents.
The Taliban may be cruel but they are also adaptable. "Crafty" is the word one marine used to describe them when speaking to me a week or so ago. He had just lost two colleagues to Taliban grenades.
When the insurgents realised they could not beat the coalition in a head-on battle, they introduced roadside bombs.
And now they realise that this war, already deeply unpopular at home, can only become more so if Afghan troops keep killing British, American and other servicemen.
"What do you say to the wife of a soldier killed by an Afghan soldier," a coalition general said to me last week. "There is nothing you can say."
The fear among those leading this war is that the relentless green on blue killings will accelerate the exit of troops.
The public is already sick of these killings and they could provide Western politicians with a good excuse to quit. After all, why hang around for another two years if the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily, and your allies keep shooting you dead?
A substantial and early drawdown of British troops is already being privately considered.
President Karzai might not realise it, said another diplomat, but you cannot underestimate Western fatigue with this war and with corruption here.
There is a shift taking place in the coalition's vision of the future of Afghanistan .
Speak to senior generals and diplomats and they have a view of what the country looks like after they have gone. Kabul and other cities remain in government hands, the east will remain as lawless as ever, and the south, well… "there will have to be some accommodation in the south".
What does that mean?
It means that the Taliban, in some areas, will be back for good.
One of the most senior diplomats here sat in my garden recently and sighed.
This is a war of diminished expectations and one where the West will never utter the word "victory".
He said, "Do not ask me if it was worth it, because it was not."
So what, I asked, was the best possible outcome?
He replied, "All we want is a country that we can forget about."
British 'green-on-blue' deaths 2012:
26 March: Sgt Luke Taylor, 33, of Royal Marines; L/Cpl Michael Foley, 25, of Adjutant General's Corps
12 May: L/Cpl Lee Davies, 27, of 1st Battalion Welsh Guards; Cpl Brent McCarthy, 25, RAF airman
2 July: Guardsmen Craig Roderick, 22, and Apete Tuisovurua, 28, both of 1st Battalion Welsh Guards; Warrant Officer Class Two Perran Thomas, 44, of Royal Corps of Signals
15 September: Sgt Gareth Thursby, 29, and Pte Thomas Wroe, 18, both of 3rd Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment
Afghan 'green-on-blue' attacks:
2007 - 2 attacks, 2 Isaf soldiers dead
2008 - 2 attacks, 2 dead
2009 - 6 attacks, 10 dead
2010 - 6 attacks, 20 dead
2011 - 21 attacks, 35 dead
2012 (so far) - 36 attacks, 51 dead
Source: International Security Assistance Force (Isaf)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-19834021
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18 September 2012 Last updated at 19:20
What lies behind Afghanistan 's insider attacks?
A string of deadly insider attacks has been one of the defining features of the latest phase of the conflict in Afghanistan .
This year has witnessed a sharp rise in attacks on Nato forces by rogue Afghan soldiers, believed to account for about 15% of coalition casualties so far in 2012. #
The killings have undermined Nato's ambition to fight "shoulder to shoulder", against the Taliban. August proved to be the deadliest month for such attacks, and in September Nato announced it was restricting operations with Afghan troops.
But what lies behind these incidents? BBC News examines the complex web of factors that lead Afghan soldiers to turn their guns on their allies.
TALIBAN INFILTRATION AND DEFECTIONS
It is difficult to develop a clear picture of why this happens as few "rogue" soldiers are taken alive - most were shot dead and several have escaped.
Meanwhile, the Taliban claimed responsibility for almost every instance of an Afghan man in uniform gunning down his Nato ally. Few believe such claims are credible.
In August, Nato officials estimated that about 25% of these attacks were the result of Taliban infiltration into the security forces. Officials had previously said that about 10% of the attacks had insurgent links. They have been quick to point out that Afghan forces also turn their weapons on other Afghan soldiers.
Nevertheless, Afghan officials believe this figure underestimates the true level of Taliban infiltration or influence.
The BBC's correspondent in Kabul, Bilal Sarwary, has examined a number of insider attack cases, and discovered that a disproportionate number of the soldiers come from two remote districts in Afghanistan's eastern Nangarhar province, close to the porous border with Pakistan. These are areas where Taliban militants wield influence over local populations and the writ of central government is weak.
Furthermore, our correspondent found that many of the cases involved fake recruitment files and Afghan intelligence officials have spoken of the "nightmare" of being confronted with yet another case of a rogue soldier whose recruitment files have serious flaws.
In these remote districts, mobile phone ring tones sing out Taliban chants. Even if the Taliban have not actively recruited the rogue soldiers, the influence they might have on vulnerable soldiers is not to be taken lightly, intelligence officials argue.
One commander for the Afghan local police in Kunar - who used to be a Taliban fighter - told our correspondent: "Two years ago [in 2010] there was a decision taken by Taliban leadership to focus more on infiltration and rogue soldiers instead of suicide attacks, and other attacks."
But - perhaps worryingly for Nato - the motivation for many of the assaults cannot be pinned down so precisely. Many analysts believe they are rooted in underlying, even subconscious, resentments that are prone to flare up and with deadly consequences.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES - DAWOOD AZAMI, BBC WORLD SERVICE
In the early part of the last century, the British on India 's north-west frontier worked with Pashtun militias and it was not uncommon for units with a good combat record to turn and shoot their British advisers. Many of these incidents were simply down to cultural misunderstandings.
Pashtun culture is governed by strict codes. The main pillar of the Pashtun code is called Pashtunwali and Afghans will do anything to protect this. It means they are very sensitive to anything perceived to insult their traditions, religion and values.
It has been called "motivation by rage rather than ideology" and perceived personal, cultural and religious transgressions can prompt such rage.
Sometimes such transgressions are seemingly innocent, but many security personnel come from conservative and rural areas where such codes are important.
Profanity is seen as deeply insulting, even though it may be used casually and even humorously by Western soldiers. When American soldiers raises their hand, it is generally a signal to stop. In Afghanistan , it is simply a greeting.
US soldiers are often accused of appearing arrogant and superior - such perceived attitudes can be deeply hurtful. Quite often foreign forces have no idea they have just insulted their colleagues.
And then there are the more serious transgressions.
In Afghanistan the desecration - albeit accidental - of the Koran, or American soldiers urinating on the bodies of dead Taliban fighters or posing for photographs with body parts have all caused anger.
One rogue soldier I interviewed after he killed three British soldiers in 2010 said he witnessed the killing of a young girl by coalition forces: "Was she a Taliban? They didn't even know her name," he told me. The UK Ministry of Defence rejects his claim.
Night raids and raids on homes of suspected fighters are to Nato ordinary and necessary military operations, but many Afghans believe the home is a sanctuary.
The list keeps growing and each incident reminds the soldier of all the previous indignities.
Under the Pashtun code called Melmastya, which means hospitality, Afghans will protect a guest at any cost. But their guests' conduct must also remain within certain parameters. If they fail to respect the values of their host, they cross the line.
Many of the soldiers killed by their Afghan colleagues - sometimes without even knowing - will have crossed the line.
COMBAT STRESS AND STRAIN - BILAL SARWARY, BBC NEWS, KABUL
The average Afghan soldier comes from poor and remote areas. One soldier told me that he joined up because he got rice and meat twice a day. These are the kind of luxuries they cannot afford in their communities.
On one recent trip, a number of border policemen told me they had been brought up by stepmothers and joined the police because they were not well looked after.
Another soldier said his only love in life was having a gun and firing it - that is why he joined the army.
But once they join up, the stresses and strains of a violent posting can place unbearable pressure on them. The food is terrible, they are exhausted and many complain that they do not get enough leave, their pay arrives late and when they fall ill, there is poor medical care.
Local commanding officers have little experience too and some soldiers complain of violence and sometimes even abuse.
When a young Afghan man in uniform posted to an area with a particularly brutal insurgency is faced with such pressures, the results can be unpredictable.
DIVIDED LOYALTIES - BILAL SARWARY
Family, village and tribal ties are the glue of Afghan society.
One of the angry protests against the inadvertent burning of copies of the Koran by Nato soldiers took place at a Nato base in Khogyani, in the eastern province of Nangarhar in February.
Local villagers came to the base and the protest turned ugly. One of the Afghan soldiers at that base was from the village and when he saw locals from his home village up against troops at the base he picked up his gun and killed two US soldiers.
The Afghan army does not allow soldiers to serve in their home village but, in this case, the village came to the base and the soldier could not contain his anger.
And a number of policemen and soldiers will have family members affiliated to the Taliban - such is the intricate web of Afghan family and clan networks.
Authorities say the vast majority of Afghan soldiers are professional and understand their duties. But circumstances can conspire to test loyalties.
At a recent ceremony at Bagram, one Afghan commander told TV crews where to start filming - he pointed out politically sensitive locations. A US soldier harshly reprimanded him for this.
The commander turned towards the US soldier via his translator and said: "If I had a gun, I would empty an entire magazine in your stomach."
THE VIEW FROM A US SOLDIER - MAJOR BENJAMIN TUPPER
I compare it to a marriage. Marriages start great, the first years are a honeymoon, the middle years get a little grinding. Sometime in the later years things fall apart.
My guess is a lot of people in Afghanistan , 10 years ago, loved the fact the West was there. A decade later they are just tired of it. They are tired of our fumbles and bumbles and mistakes. They are tired of the enemy that seems to have no shortage of bold attacks.
I also know the Americans and British and Romanians and Polish I served with in Afghanistan , we had good intentions. We went in there with the highest degree of respect and camaraderie that we could towards our Afghan soldier and police peers as well as civilians.
Even with those good intentions, we have to be honest that we have left a track record of mistakes. Some of them have been literal mistakes such as bombing the wrong compound.
I always point to the example of the sergeant who went out in the middle of the night and killed Afghan women and children. While we discount them and say that sergeant had mental problems, Afghans see a guy in US army uniform.
Even though 99.9% of us go in with good intentions and professional standards... some Afghans have gone from loving the West to wondering what our true intentions are.
Major Benjamin Tupper was interviewed for BBC Radio 4's PM programme. He is the author of Greetings From Afghanistan, Send More Ammo: Dispatches from Taliban Country.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19633418
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1 May 2012 Last updated at 13:29
Nato grapples with rogue elements in Afghan ranks
By Quentin Sommerville - BBC News, Helmand Province , Afghanistan
Through thick mud in Helmand province, a joint Afghan and British patrol snakes its way through fields deep in opium poppies and wheat.
They march in single file in the hope of reducing the chances of triggering a Taliban roadside bomb. #
But the Taliban are not the only threat to British soldiers.
In this year alone, 18 foreign soldiers have been killed by the Afghans they serve alongside.
A dramatic jump in so called green-on-blue killings, amounting to an average of one a week this year, has led to a serious erosion of trust. Only Taliban bombs have killed more international soldiers.
Maj Bev Allen of the Royal Anglian Regiment, who is leading the British advisers on this patrol, acknowledges that "there are moments when we are vulnerable".
"We live out in austere locations, we have procedures. We remain vigilant at all times, and we try to keep that risk to a minimum," he said.
"But it's one of the most important elements of the job we do here. We demonstrate to the Afghans that we trust them, and that we are in the fight and we share the danger with them."
Convivial atmosphere
The soldiers on the patrol say they never fully let their guard down.
Only last month, Sgt Luke Taylor and L/Cpl Michael Foley were murdered by an Afghan army sergeant.
The Afghan military has apologised but offers little reassurance that it will not happen again.
"We do our best, our intelligence departments try to prevent [the] entering of enemies into the Afghan National Army [ANA] but [we] cannot promise that it will not happen again... I can't say anything about it, it is out of my control," Brig Gen Sherin Shah of the ANA said.
The soldiers stop for tea. It is a rare moment to relax and the atmosphere is convivial.
But troops are now taking more precautions. At all times, someone will remain armed - a guardian angel - to protect against rogue Afghans.
And according to a senior Nato-official, further precautions are being taken.
ANA soldiers returning from leave in insurgent-affected areas will be screened to see if they have been intimidated.
Phones have been withdrawn from Afghan soldiers on operations.
'Trustworthy'
Also, Taliban ring tones have been banned, even when the Afghan security forces use them as a joke.
Sgt Simon Mercer works closely with Afghan artillery soldiers and sees little difference in them compared to British soldiers.
"You have to be aware about what you're saying, there are cultural taboos that you don't want to cross, talking about women, things like that," he said.
"But it's all to be taken with a bit of salt - once you build up a relationship with them, they are just as trustworthy as the soldiers that I work with, day-to-day, in the UK ."
Pte Christopher Jackson took a different view when I asked him if he 100% trusted Afghan soldiers.
"I'd say 70%, you've always got to be wary, because there are some that are not who they say they are, but in general most of them are a decent bunch of lads," he replied.
The Afghan military did not want us speaking to their soldiers, but in a brief exchange one explained that feelings of distrust are mutual.
"I trust them, as much as they trust me," he said.
The recent burning of the Koran by American soldiers - they claim inadvertently - exposed the gulf between foreigners and Afghans.
As a result more foreign soldiers were killed by their Afghan partners. The Taliban said they were responsible - and that they had soldiers hidden in army ranks waiting to strike.
Nato commanders at bases here in the south of Afghanistan , however, insist that the Taliban have not infiltrated the Afghan security forces.
But that is open to question. What we do know is that some of those who killed Nato soldiers were at least Taliban sympathisers and that as the Afghan Army and police grow, the number of these attacks will correspondingly increase.
The operation ends as darkness falls with an address from Maj Allen. His message is work hard on making this relationship work, because Afghans taking the lead means that British troops can go home.
Even though it is eroded, the partnership has never been more important, because these Afghan soldiers are Britain 's exit strategy.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17895165
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2 March 2012 Last updated at 01:09
Nato's crisis of trust in Afghanistan
The man blamed for killing two Nato officials inside the Afghan interior ministry at the weekend should never have been given security clearance, the BBC has learned. A catalogue of security blunders led to the shootings and his escape. There are now real concerns for the future of the relationship between Nato and its Afghan security partners, Bilal Sarwary reports from Kabul .
The shootings are the latest in a long list of incidents in which members of the Afghan security forces have turned their arms on coalition troops. Officials feel powerless to stop them despite elaborate security mechanisms that are supposed to be in place.#
Concern about the issue among US and Nato officials has now become so great that trust between them and Afghan security and military officials is at an all-time low. Many fear the long term strategic relationship between the two sides could be affected.
The interior ministry documents show that Abdul Saboor was sacked twice by police because on one occasion he got into a scuffle with his colleagues and another time he displayed violent behaviour.
But still he was able to get security clearance when he was re-hired by the police for a third time to work as an interior ministry driver.
Irretrievable breakdown
"He should never have been a police intelligence officer," a frustrated Western military official posted in Afghanistan said. "He should have never got the security clearance."
Occurrences in which Afghans turn their weapons on their Western counterparts happen on an almost weekly basis - shortly before the incident at the interior ministry, two US soldiers were shot and killed by an Afghan National Army soldier during protests at a Nato base in eastern Nangarhar province.
And on Thursday two more US soldiers were shot dead in the south of the country - Nato said one of the men was dressed in Afghan army uniform.
In fact, more than 70 Nato troops have been killed by Afghan colleagues in recent years, leading to what some diplomats say is an irretrievable breakdown of trust between the two sides.
Although Nato's Afghan commander Gen John Allen said he would still be willing to walk, unarmed, into the Kabul interior ministry, few coalition troops on the ground have such confidence in their Afghan colleagues - some of whom continue to receive Taliban propaganda on their mobile telephones.
The stark fact is that Nato troops are now nervous and twitchy whenever they are with their Afghan counterparts, and an investigation conducted by the BBC into what led to the interior ministry shootings on Saturday clearly explains why.
Interior ministry paperwork seen by the BBC suggests that the recruitment and vetting of personnel for the Afghan army and security forces is so deeply flawed that any effort to improve it is bound to be a time-consuming and painstaking process.
Western officials and their Afghan counterparts are in despair over how easily Abdul Saboor was able to bypass security in what was supposed to be a high security building and carry out the killings - apparently in retaliation to the burning of copies of the Koran by US soldiers.
''There are a number of serious security flaws," a senior officer of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), told the BBC.
"The first thing you do when such an incident happens is lock down the building and detain everyone, including eyewitnesses. But no such drill was carried out in this case."
This allowed the killer to jump three security cordons surrounding the ministry, he said. As if this was not worrying enough in itself, the incident also graphically exposed serious lapses in the vetting process of Afghan soldiers and policemen.
Much revolves around the recruitment process itself - many prospective employees have fake identities, fake references and fake signatures.
That begs the question, how many more Abdul Saboors might there be out there?
Violent behaviour
The documents seen by the BBC are hardly reassuring. They show that Abdul Saboor was twice fired from the Afghan National Police for "misconduct".
"How on earth then did he succeed in gaining entry to the intelligence wing of the police?" asked an investigating officer.
"Who gave him security clearance to be deployed at such a sensitive spot with his record?"
That is a question that is likely to go unanswered - there is currently a blame game between different governments ministries as to who is responsible.
Some of Abdul Saboor's relatives believe that there may be a peculiarly Afghan answer to this question, linked to patronage and corruption.
They say that he succeeded in winning the trust and backing of former Minister Hanif Atmaar after returning from religious school in Pakistan in 2007 to work in the ministry as a tea boy.
Interior ministry sources say that two of Mr Atmaar's top aides acted as his guarantors when he expressed a desire to develop his career and join the police.
Mr Atmaar denied having anything to do with Abdul Saboor, who he said was sacked after only four months at the ministry. He says that the priority now is to find out who re-employed him and who gave him such high security clearance.
Such informal arrangements - often with employees whose records are never properly checked - are commonplace in government ministries and other public offices.
Western diplomats say the problem can only be sorted out once long term problems such as patronage, corruption, personal connections and nepotism are addressed.
They say that a turf war between the NDS - the country's main spy agency - and the defence ministry also needs to be resolved.
In another peculiarly Afghan dimension to the Abdul Saboor case, Western and Afghan officials say Shiren Agha, the commander in charge of interior ministry security, was responsible for his recruitment. Officials say that Mr Agha is related to Interior Minister Bismillah Khan by marriage.
But Sediq Sediqi, a spokesman for the interior ministry, told the BBC there was no relationship between Shiren Agha and Mr Khan.
Although Abdul Saboor worked only as a bodyguard and driver for Mr Agha, he was still allowed entry into the most sensitive installations at the interior ministry, where night raids, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics operations are planned and controlled.
"As painful as it might be, it is a reality that a combination of time-honoured problems and serious mistakes allowed Saboor to get into the ministry," a Western diplomat said.
"It is a pattern that is being depressingly repeated across the country."
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17219153
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